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Abstract
This paper shows that some of the puzzling observations in the protracted reces-
sions of the 1990s in Japan and the 1930s in the United States can be accounted for
by a simple variant of the neoclassical growth model with borrowing constraints.
There are three puzzles: First, a large wedge emerged between the marginal rate
of substitution between consumption and leisure and the marginal product of labor.
This labor wedge is associated with declines in labor inputs. Second, although
shrinkage of investment was observed in both episodes, a wedge that represents
investment frictions did not emerge. Third, in spite of unprecedented monetary
easing in Japan since the late 1990s, deﬂation has continued.
A key ingredient is the emergence of a huge accumulation of nonperforming debts,
which must have been a consequence of the large ﬂuctuations in asset prices. The
debts tighten the borrowing constraints and can cause the puzzling features of the
recessions, which may be protracted if the bad debt problem persists for years.
JEL Classiﬁcation: E32, E44, E51, G12.
Key words: Borrowing constraint, labor wedge, nonperforming debts, monetary
policy, deﬂation.
∗Fellow, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry. 1-3-1 Kasumigaseki, Chiyoda-
ku, Tokyo 100-8901, JAPAN. +81-3-3501-8308 (phone), +81-3-5510-3927 (fax). E-mail: kobayashi-
keiichiro@rieti.go.jp.
†Graduate School of Economics, University of Tokyo.
1“I recognized this kind of paralysis from my Goldman Sachs days. The atti-
tude of much of Japan’s political establishment seemed to be that of a trader
praying over his weakening positions, when what he needed to do was to
reevaluate them unsentimentally and make whatever changes made sense.”
Robert E. Rubin, In an Uncertain World (New York: Random House, 2003),
chap. 8
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The Great Depression in the United States and the 1990s in Japan are both charac-
terized as persistent recessions of economies suﬀering from serious nonperforming debt
problems subsequent to asset-price collapses. This paper shows that a simple variant
of a neoclassical growth model with borrowing constraints can account for some puz-
zling observations of the US Great Depression and the 1990s in Japan that ordinary real
business cycle models have not been able to explain.
We address three puzzles in this paper. A puzzle for the Great Depression, which
was recently pointed out by Mulligan (2002) and Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2002,
2004), is the emergence of a large “labor wedge,” which is a wedge between the marginal
rate of substitution between consumption and leisure (MRS) and the marginal product
of labor (MPL). Assuming that the aggregate behavior of the US economy is described
by the neoclassical growth model, they show that the labor wedge emerged and widened
during 1929—33. In a neoclassical model, this wedge is modeled as a labor tax. Mulligan
argues that the actual tax policies of the federal and state governments during that time
period cannot fully account for this wide wedge. Mulligan and Chari et al. conclude
that any theories attempting to account for the Great Depression must explain the large
labor wedge. We also calculated the labor wedge for the 1990s in Japan. Following Chari
et al. (2002), we deﬁned the labor wedge (1 − τlt)a s









2where U(ct,n t)i st h eﬂow utility for the consumer, ct is consumption in year t, nt is labor
supply, Uc(t)( Un(t)) denotes the derivative of the utility function at t with respect to
ct (nt), and At is the productivity of the Cobb-Douglas production function Atkα
t n1−α
t .
Figure 1 shows the labor wedge measured from the Japanese data. See Kobayashi and
Inaba (2005) for the details of the calculation. We assumed that the ﬂow utility for the
representative consumer is U(ct,n t)=l nct + γ ln(1 − nt), where γ =2 .
Figure 1. Labor wedge in the 1990s in Japan
This ﬁgure shows that the labor wedge continued to deteriorate throughout the 1990s
and the early 2000s. We think that this wedge might have been the primal contributor
to the protracted recession. Thus it seems that the recession in Japan also shows the
same puzzle for neoclassical models: Why did the labor wedge widen in the recession?1
Another ﬁnding by Chari et al. (2002, 2004) is the second puzzle for the Great
Depression: The existence of investment frictions is not empirically established. Assum-
ing that investment frictions must manifest themselves as an (imaginary) investment tax,
Chari et al. estimated the Euler equation for capital stocks in a one-sector growth model:







+( 1+τxt+1)(1 − δ)
)
, (2)
where δ is the depreciation rate of capital and τxt is the imaginary investment tax that
represents investment frictions. See Chari et al. (2002, 2004) for details. They found
that τxt did not increase and even decreased after the onset of the Great Depression.
We conducted the same estimation and got the same result in Kobayashi and Inaba
(2005): τxt decreased during the 1930s, implying that investment frictions seem to have
improved. In the same paper, we also conducted an estimation for the Japanese economy
and found that τxt did not increase in the 1990s, implying no deterioration of investment
1One standard explanation suggested by Chari et al. (2004) is nominal wage rigidity. As we argue in
Kobayashi and Inaba (2005), however, this explanation is not consistent with the facts in the late 1990s
in Japan, when wages became more and more ﬂexible. If nominal rigidity were the main cause of the
deterioration of the labor wedge, it would have improved in the late 1990s, while the data show that it
c o n t i n u e dt ow o r s e ni nt h a tp e r i o d .
3frictions. These results for the Great Depression and the 1990s in Japan seem puzzling,
because investment expenditure decreased drastically during both depression episodes.
The third puzzle concerns deﬂation and monetary policy. A big topic in macroeco-
nomic policy debate in Japan since the late 1990s is persistent deﬂation and the seeming
liquidity trap. The deposit rate has been virtually zero since the mid-1990s, and the
call rate has been kept at zero since 1999. Although the Bank of Japan conducted un-
precedented monetary easing, the consumer price index continued to decline for about
eight years starting in 1998, and it is said that a wide output gap continued to exist.
It seems to us a puzzling challenge to understand coherently the prolonged coexistence
in the late 1990s and the early 2000s of the output gap, deﬂation, and unprecedented
monetary easing (the zero-interest-rate policy and the quantitative easing policy).2 The
conventional view in academia is that the output gap and deﬂation were caused by an
exogenous and somewhat exotic shock to productivity (Krugman [1998]) or preference
(Auerbach and Obstfeld [2005]), and that the current monetary policy of the BoJ is
not suﬃciently expansionary to eradicate the perverse eﬀects of the shocks (Eggertsson
and Woodford [2003], Bernanke [2003], Svensson [2003]). The view that we pursue in
this paper is quite diﬀerent from the conventional view but simple and self-consistent:
Extraordinary monetary easing that ﬁxes the nominal interest rate at zero generates
deﬂation as an equilibrium outcome in an economy where the real rate of interest is
determined in the market equilibrium; and in the meantime, persistent real distortions,
which are represented by the large labor wedge, are caused by a nonmonetary factor,
i.e., tightened borrowing constraints.
One contribution of this paper is to show that a simple variant of the neoclassical
growth model with borrowing constraints can account for the above puzzles. It is shown
that persistent tightening of the constraints can be a major source of the puzzling features
in depression episodes. Another contribution is to specify the most plausible cause of
the tightening of the borrowing constraints. It is shown that productivity declines may
2There exist several studies that imply Japan’s monetary policy in the early 1990s was too tight. See,
for example, Bernanke and Gertler (1999) and Ahearne et al. (2002). But these studies may not explain
the deﬂation since the late 1990s, when monetary policy has been suﬃciently loosened.
4not be the primal cause of the tightening; instead, the emergence and persistence of
nonperforming debts may be the most promising factor that tightens the constraints.
We also clarify the nature of ﬁnancial arrangements and political distortions concerning
debt restructuring that may lengthen the recession.
In this paper, we show that persistent tightening of borrowing constraints may be a
useful building block for literature in which researchers try to account for historic busi-
ness cycle episodes using quantitative dynamic general equilibrium models. For example,
Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2004) try to account for the US Great Depression, and
Christiano and Fujiwara (2005) for the 1990s in Japan. They incorporate many twists
into a standard neoclassical growth model based on Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans
(2005), the key features of which are habit persistence, variable capital utilization, ad-
justment costs for capital formation, and nominal rigidities.3 The tightened borrowing
constraints may be useful to improve the models if they are combined with habit persis-
tence, adjustment costs in investment, and the like. The constraints may also be regarded
as an alternative to a hypothesis that Christiano and Fujiwara adopt to explain the de-
cline in labor input during the 1990s in Japan, i.e., tightened working-hour regulation.4
The regulatory change may be a useful hypothesis but is unique to Japan, while declines
in labor input and deterioration of labor wedges have been commonly observed in both
the US Great Depression and Japan’s recession. (There is also another episode: Ahearne,
Kydland, and Wynne [2005] report the deterioration of a labor wedge in Ireland.) Our
hypothesis of the borrowing constraints can be used to account for not only Japan but
also the US Great Depression and others.5
The organization of the paper is as follows: In the next section, we present the
basic model with an exogenous borrowing constraint, and show that a tightening of the
3Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) put ﬁnancial frictions in a similar setting.
4The change in labor policy is modeled as a sudden decline in the total endowment of time for the
representative consumer.
5Borrowing constraints also seem to be a useful ingredient in the model of a small open economy for
explaining the “Sudden Stops” observed in emerging economies. See, for example, Mendoza and Smith
(2004).
5constraint can consistently account for the above puzzling observations. In Section 3, we
endogenize the borrowing constraint so that borrowing is constrained by the corporate
value of the borrower. In this generalized model, we show that a sudden emergence of
nonperforming debts and the existence of political or institutional distortions that delay
debt repayment are both necessary to produce a persistent tightening of the borrowing
constraint. We also show that the emergence of persistent nonperforming debts and an
exogenous decline of productivity are both necessary for the endogenous model to account
for the three puzzles consistently. In Section 4, we propose a modiﬁed model, in which
ﬁrms own the shares of other ﬁrms and the shares work as collateral for the shareholders’
debts. In this case, the emergence of persistent nonperforming debts alone can account
for the above puzzles without resorting to an exogenous decline of productivity. Section
5 provides some concluding remarks.
2 The basic model - Exogenous borrowing constraints
The basic model is a dynamic general equilibrium model, which can be regarded as a
simpliﬁed version of Einarsson and Marquis (2001). A borrowing constraint of a type
proposed by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Kocherlakota (2000) is incorporated in it.
The banking sector, nominal currency, and the monetary authority are explicitly
introduced in this model, as in Einarsson and Marquis. All these features are relevant
only to monetary policy issues. They could be abstracted away if we did not analyze
monetary policy, and the model would become simpler. We decided, however, to pay the
cost of complication of the model, since the implications for monetary policy seem quite
important.
The economy is a variant of the discrete time neoclassical growth model, which is
composed of consumers, ﬁrms, banks, and one government. Throughout this paper, we
assume for simplicity of the analysis that there is no aggregate nor idiosyncratic risk.
Later we analyze the dynamics in the case where the economy is hit by an unexpected
macroeconomic shock, which tightens borrowing constraints for ﬁrms. We simply assume
that the initial shock is unexpected in the sense that it is a measure zero event, and that
6it never occurs again.
2.1 Structure
The economy is populated with a continuum of consumers with identical preferences,
whose measure is normalized to one. There are also continua of ﬁrms and banks with
measure one, respectively.
Consumer




where β is the discount factor (0 < β < 1), ct is the consumption in year t,a n dnt is the
labor input sold to ﬁrms for production. In each year t, the consumer is endowed with
1 unit of time, which can be divided into labor and leisure. Thus, 1 − nt is the amount
of leisure that the consumer can enjoy in year t.T h e ﬂow utility U(ct,n t) is concave,
twice-diﬀerentiable, and increasing in both consumption (ct) and leisure (1 − nt). In
order to simplify the analysis, the functional form for U(c,n) is speciﬁed as
U(c,n)=l nc + γ ln(1 − n),
where γ (> 0) is a positive parameter. The consumer’s income consists of wage wtnt and
the returns from ﬁnancial assets: Cash Mt, bank deposits Dt, and corporate shares st.







ct + ptMt+1 + ptDt+1 + qtst+1 ≤ wtnt + ptMt +( 1+rdt)ptDt +( πt + qt)st, (4)
where pt is the inverse of the nominal price of consumer goods, qt is the real price of
corporate shares, wt is the real wage rate, rdt is the nominal deposit rate, and πt is the
7dividend from one unit of corporate shares. The consumer takes wt, pt, qt, rdt,a n dπt as
given. Note that the representative consumer does not maximize the expected value of
the discounted sum of future utilities, since we assumed that there is no aggregate risk















where λt is the Lagrange multiplier for (4). Comparing the FOCs for Mt+1 and Dt+1,i t




(1 + rdt+1)pt+1. (8)
Firm
There exist identical ﬁrms that compete in a perfectly competitive market. The
ownership of the ﬁrms is traded as corporate shares, the measure of which is normalized
to one. We assume for simplicity that the consumers own all corporate shares. (An
assumption that ﬁrms can invest in the corporate shares of other ﬁrms does not change
the basic results in this section. See Section 4 for a modiﬁcation of the model in which
ﬁrms own other ﬁrms’ shares.) A representative ﬁrm generates the following real proﬁts
in each year t:
πt = Akα
t n1−α
t − [kt+1 − (1 − δ)kt] − (1 + rbt)ptLt, (9)
where the ﬁrm produces Akα
t n1−α
t units of consumer goods from capital input kt and
labor input nt, δ is the depreciation of capital, rbt is the loan rate, and Lt is the nominal
amount of bank loans that the ﬁrm borrows in year t − 1. As in Einarsson and Marquis
(2001), we assume that loan Lt is used to ﬁnance the portion of the ﬁrm’s working capital
expenses consisting of its wage bill in year t, wtnt.D i ﬀerent from Einarsson and Marquis,
8we assume that loan Lt is provided in the form of a bank deposit, which earns interest
rdtLt before the ﬁrm pays the wage bill in year t. Thus, the wage bill and the bank loan
satisfy
wtnt =( 1+rdt)ptLt. (10)
As a basic model, we introduce an exogenous borrowing constraint for the ﬁrm like that
in Kocherlakota (2000):
(1 + rbt)ptLt ≤ bt, (11)
where bt is an exogenous real limit of borrowing. The ﬁrm can borrow from banks in
such a way that the repayment in year t does not exceed bt. The parameter bt represents
the ﬁrm’s limited ability of commitment. In Sections 3 and 4, we generalize this model
so that bt is endogenously determined. The ﬁrm acts in the interest of shareholders and







subject to (10) and (11), where the ﬁrm takes pt, wt, rdt, rbt,a n dλt(=
βt
ct )a sg i v e n




























There are identical banks in a perfectly competitive market. A representative bank’s
liabilities consist of interest-bearing deposit accounts Xt, and its asset consist of reserves
9Zt and loans Ls




t + Zt − (1 + rdt)Xt. (15)
As in Einarsson and Marquis (2000), we assume that the consumers own all banks.
Although we omitted bank shares in the consumer’s problem, this omission is justiﬁed,
since competition among banks always makes banks’ proﬁt zero in the equilibrium. A








subject to a balance sheet constraint
Ls
t + Zt = Xt, (16)
its reserve requirements
Zt ≥ ζXt, 0 < ζ < 1, (17)
where ζ is the reserve requirement ratio, and the nonnegativity constraints (Zt, Ls
t, Xt
≥ 0,∀t). Assuming that rdt > 0, it is easily shown that in the equilibrium where ΠB
t =0






The government determines the nominal deposit rate rdt and the nominal bank re-
serves Zt. It is shown in the next subsection that rdt and Zt are not independent in
the equilibrium as long as rdt > 0. The government supplies cash Mt + Zt passively to
consumers on demand.
2.2 Equilibrium dynamics
The equilibrium condition for consumer goods is
ct + kt+1 − (1 − δ)kt = Akα
t n1−α
t . (19)
10Given k0, the equilibrium path of {ct,n t,k t+1}∞
t=0 is determined by (5), (6), (12) (or
[13]), (14), and (19). In the case where the borrowing constraint is not binding or bt is
constant, the initial consumption c0 is chosen so that the equilibrium path converges to
the steady state.
Given the initial price p0 and the sequence {ct}∞
t=0,t h ei n ﬂation rate is determined
by (8).
The equilibrium condition for bank loans is Lt = Ls
t, and that for bank deposits
is Xt = Dt + Lt, since bank loans are provided to ﬁrms in the form of deposits. The
balance sheet identity of the bank and the reserve requirements imply that Zt = Dt,a n d
Zt ≥
ζ
1−ζLt.T h eﬁrm’s problem implies that Lt = wtnt










Note that this relationship between Zt and rdt holds with equality if rdt > 0. Thus,
(20) uniquely determines the value of Zt in the equilibrium if the government sets rdt at
a positive value. If, on the other hand, the government sets rdt = 0, the bank reserve
Zt (and the consumers’ deposits Dt) may be arbitrarily larger than the value on the
right-hand side of (20).
2.3 Simulation
We set α =0 .3, β =0 .98, γ =2 ,δ =0 .06, ζ =0 .1, and A = 1. We assume that the
economy was initially in the steady state where the nominal deposit rate was rdt = 1
β −1,
so that inﬂation is zero from equation (8), and the borrowing constraint was slightly
binding. The initial value of bt was 0.37 for t<0. Thus the initial capital stock was
k∗ =2 .0094, the steady state value. In year 0, an unexpected macroeconomic shock
hits the economy and the value of bt becomes small, so that the borrowing constraint is
tightened from year 0 onward.
We conduct two simulations: In one case, bt = b for all t ≥ 0, where b (= 0.3) is small;
a n di nt h eo t h e rc a s e ,bt becomes smaller gradually. Initially, b0 =0 .335, and thereafter
the borrowing constraint is tightened, so that bt =0 .335 − 0.0025 × t for 1 ≤ t ≤ 14,
11and bt =0 .3 for all t ≥ 15. In both cases, the equilibrium path is calculated on the
premise that the government chooses one of the following two monetary policies: either
unchanged at rdt = 1
β − 1 for all t, or monetary easing that sets rdt =0f o rt ≥ 0.
To compute the equilibrium path, we use a variant of the shooting method in which we
solve the system of the diﬀerence equations backward from a point in the neighborhood
of the new steady state and ﬁnd the path that satisﬁes the initial condition: k0 = k∗.
We use this computation method for all simulations in this paper.
Figure 2 shows the simulation results for the case where bt =0 .3 for all t ≥ 0a n d
rdt = 1
β − 1 for all t.S i n c e t h e d i ﬀerence in monetary policy does not change the
simulation results essentially except for the inﬂation rate, we show only the inﬂation rate
for the case of rdt = 0 in the last panel of Figure 2. Figure 3 shows the simulation results
for the case where bt decreases gradually and remains at a low level from date 15 onward.
In Figure 3 as well, all the panels except for the last one show the results for the case
where rdt = 1
β − 1; the last panel shows the inﬂation rate for the case of rdt =0 .
Figure 2. Dynamics with exogenous borrowing constraints (bt constant)
Figure 3. Dynamics with exogenous borrowing constraints (bt declines gradually)
These simulation results show that labor input, investment, and the labor wedge
jump down in year 0 and stagnate afterwards; consumption and capital stock decrease
gradually and converge to the new steady state where bt =0 .3. These features seem
consistent with the (detrended) performance of the economy during the US Great De-
pression and the 1990s in Japan.
Labor wedge
As for the ﬁrst puzzle for the depression episodes, the simulation results for the labor
wedge are consistent with recent empirical ﬁndings. Since wage bills are ﬁnanced by bank
loans, the tightening of the borrowing constraint makes labor more expensive for ﬁrms,
which therefore reduce their demand for labor. Thus, we can interpret the persistent
tightening of the borrowing constraint as a persistent demand shock that is observed as
12a deterioration of the labor wedge.6
Investment wedge
The decreases in investment and steady-state capital stock are a natural consequence








k does not change even if b changes, and the decrease in
the equilibrium value of n leads to the decrease in k. In other words, since labor input
decreases, capital stock must also decrease to restore the marginal product of capital.
The following can be said about the second puzzle concerning the investment wedge:
Since we assumed that the expenditure for investment is not subject to the borrowing
constraint in this basic model, it is easily shown that the investment wedge will be zero
for all t in the simulation. This is a straightforward result from comparing (2) and
(14). The consistency between the performance of this model and the empirical ﬁndings
concerning the investment wedge implies that most of investment expenditures may not
be subject to borrowing constraints in reality, while working capital expenses, mainly
wage bills, may be subject to constraints. In other words, this result implies that in
reality any distortions (or information asymmetry) that generate borrowing constraints
may be severe for wage bills and the like but not for investment expenditures.
Deﬂation and monetary policy
The third puzzle concerns deﬂation and monetary policy. First of all, note that since
in this model monetary distortion is the only reserve requirement for banks, it is virtually
obvious that the optimal monetary policy is to set the nominal deposit rate at zero for
all t. We do not argue the optimality of monetary policy but just compare price paths in
the cases of a constant-interest-rate policy in which rdt = 1
β −1 and the zero-interest-rate
policy in which rdt =0 .
The simulation results show that if the government does not lower the nominal deposit
6Christiano and Fujiwara (2005) argue that labor input decreased in the 1990s in Japan because of
tightened working-hour regulation; they interpret this regulatory change as a supply shock.
13rate from 1
β − 1, inﬂation occurs. This result seems counterfactual for a model of the
depression episodes of the 1930s in the United States or the 1990s in Japan. But we are
quite conﬁdent that if Calvo-type staggered wage contracts, which are modeled by Erceg,
Henderson, and Levin (2000), were incorporated with our model, the initial response of
prices would be deﬂation rather than inﬂation. This is because the tightened borrowing
constraint reduces ﬁrms’ demand for labor input, and this shrinkage of demand together
with sticky wages may generate deﬂation through the mechanism described in the new
Keynesian Phillips curve (see Woodford [2003] and references therein). We are planning
to modify our model in this direction in future research.
The simulation also shows that a zero-interest-rate policy that sets rdt =0b r i n g s
about deﬂation as an equilibrium outcome. The mechanism by which deﬂation occurs is
exactly the same as that by which the Friedman rule brings about deﬂation. Although
the Friedman rule is usually described as a reduction of money supply at a constant
speed (see, for example, Ljungqvist and Sargent [2000]), the zero-interest-rate policy in
our model is compatible with (extraordinary) expansion of money supply. See (20) and
the discussion that follows. The government can set rdt at zero and Zt at an arbitrarily
large value simultaneously. In the equilibrium, Dt(= Zt) becomes large, but the inﬂation
rate that is determined by (8) is still negative. This result may not be relevant to
the US Great Depression, but it may be relevant to the quantitative easing policy in
Japan. In this policy regime, the Bank of Japan set the nominal short-term rate at
zero and also set a large target value of excess bank reserves. This policy is properly
translated in our model into a policy to set rdt at 0 and Zt at a unnecessarily large value.
Therefore, the simulation results shown in the last panels of Figures 2 and 3 imply that
to set the nominal rate at zero in a quantitative easing policy may be to cause persistent
deﬂation, while real distortions, represented by a large labor wedge, may be caused by a
nonmonetary factor, i.e., the sudden and persistent tightening of borrowing constraints.
Monetary policy may be or may not be eﬀective to mitigate real distortions caused
by a tightening of borrowing constraints. If, as we argue in the next section, the sud-
den emergence of large nonperforming debts, which may be caused by an unexpected
14asset-price collapse, brings about a severe tightening of borrowing constraints, monetary
easing may have a quite limited ability to mitigate the recession. If, on the other hand,
the tightening of borrowing constraints is caused by, say, pessimistic expectations over
monetary policy through unknown transmission mechanisms, monetary easing may be
eﬀective in loosening borrowing constraints. The welfare implication of our simulations
is as follows: Since we assume that the borrowing constraint is exogenous for monetary
policy, the eﬀect of monetary easing (the zero-interest-rate policy) is negligibly small.
T h ed i s t o r t i o nc a u s e db yt h er e s e r v er e q u i rements for banks is mitigated, but it has a
very small impact on the welfare of the representative consumer. On one hand, social
welfare (
P∞
t=0 βtU(ct,n t)) in the case where the economy stays in the steady state with
the borrowing constraint not tightened and rdt = 1
β − 1i sc a l c u l a t e dt ob e−80.1873.
On the other hand, social welfare in the case where bt =0 .3 for all t ≥ 0i s−80.3875
if rdt = 1
β − 1, and is −80.3669 if rdt = 0. Therefore, the improvement of welfare due
to monetary easing in our simulations is negligible compared with the impact of the
tightening of the borrowing constraint.
If we introduce price or wage staggeredness as in Erceg et al. (2000), it may be shown
that monetary easing can improve welfare a little more, but we are conﬁdent that the
eﬀectiveness of monetary policy due to nominal rigidities would be considerably smaller
than the welfare loss due to an exogenous tightening of borrowing constraints. To conﬁrm
this conjecture is another topic for future research.
3 The general model - Endogenous borrowing constraints
In this section, we elaborate our idea about the causes of a sudden tightening of borrowing
constraints. There are two problems that we need to address: The ﬁrst problem is why the
constraints should exist at all, and the second problem is what tightened the constraints
at the onset of the depressions. The ﬁrst problem concerns the nature of the distortions
or information asymmetry that generate borrowing constraints. The second problem
concerns the nature of the events that tighten the constraints.
153.1 Endogenous borrowing constraints and productivity declines
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) propose a plausible theory that borrowing is constrained by
the (ﬁxed) assets that the borrower owns: If a borrower does not have an ability to
precommit to the repayment, the amount he can borrow is limited by the value of the
collateral that he can put up ex ante. In the Kiyotaki-Moore model, the borrower can
abscond freely holding borrowed money, but at that time he cannot take the ﬁxed assets
(i.e., land) with him; therefore, the creditor can seize the assets and recapture the loss by
selling them when the borrower absconds; anticipating this course of action, the creditor
and the borrower agree ex ante that the borrowing is to be limited by the value of the
ﬁxed assets that the borrower owns.
We can easily incorporate the Kiyotaki-Moore theory with our model by replacing bt
in equation (11) with θkt,w h e r eθ (0 < θ < 1) is an exogenous collateral ratio.7 This
speciﬁcation of the borrowing constraint is theoretically simple and tractable. But since
our strategy is to analyze the model’s performance by numerical simulations, we need
not constrain ourselves to the simplest form. Since in reality the borrowing limit seems
to be related to the going-concern value of ﬁrms, we use the following constraint instead
of (11) in the modiﬁed model in this section:
(1 + rbt)ptLt ≤ θVt, (21)







The modiﬁed borrowing constraint (21) can be regarded as a generalized form of the
Kiyotaki-Moore type constraint, and can be justiﬁed by a similar argument as that in
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997): The manager of the borrowing ﬁrm can freely abscond
holding the borrowed money, while he has to leave the ﬁrm behind; therefore, if the
manager absconds, the creditor can seize (a part of) the ownership of the borrower-ﬁrm;
7We assume that the borrower can take 1−θ of her assets with her when she abscond, while Kiyotaki
and Moore (1997) assumed that all assets must be left behind.
16anticipating the seizure, the creditor and the manager agree ex ante that the borrowing
is to be limited by the corporate value of the ﬁrm.8








































where μt is the Lagrange multiplier for (21).
We set θ at a small value, 0.18, so that there does not exist a steady state equilibrium
in which (21) is nonbinding. The economic variables in the steady state are obtained by
numerically solving the following equations:















































Our numerical calculations show that there are two solutions to the system of equations
(26)—(29): one with a large k and the other with a small k. These two solutions satisfy the
FOCs and the second-order conditions for the ﬁrm’s problem, so that both of them are
local optima. But we ﬁnd that only the solution with a smaller k survives as the steady
8This argument crucially depends on our assumption that there is no uncertainty in this model.
Equation (21) implies that the corporate value (or the asset price) Vt is realized at the time of repayment.
If Vt is a random variable at the time of loan contracting, the borrowing constraint must be much more
complicated in form, since it must be derived as the solution of the optimal contracting problem between
agents who have rational expectations toward Vt. For simplicity, it is assumed as in Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997) that the future path of the corporate value {Vt}
∞
t=0 is perfectly foreseen by the agents.
17state equilibrium.9 S e ef o o t n o t e1 0f o rd e t a i l s . 10 So in what follows in this subsection,
we pick a solution to (26)—(29) with a smaller k as the (possibly) unique steady state.
We calculate the steady state equilibrium where A = 1 as a benchmark: The alloca-
tions become k =2 .1207, n =0 .3094, and c =0 .4240; the labor wedge, 1 − τl,d e ﬁned
by (1) is 0.9847; and the investment wedge, 1 + τx,d e ﬁned by (2) is 0.9698.
Did productivity declines tighten borrowing constraints? The most straight-
forward candidate for the cause of the sudden tightening of the borrowing constraint in
this model is an exogenous decline of productivity, A.W ec o n ﬁrm by numerical calcula-
tion, however, that a decline of A cannot account for the observations in the depression
episodes. We numerically calculate the variables in the steady states where A =0 .9o r
less and compare the results with the benchmark where A = 1. It is shown that capital
stock k, consumption c, and corporate value V become smaller in a steady state corre-
sponding to a smaller A. But the labor wedge is invariant for diﬀerent values of A.T h e
invariance of the labor wedge is analytically proven not only for the logarismic utility
function but also for any type of utility function. See Appendix A for the proof. We also
calculate the transitional dynamics of the economy, which is initially in the steady state
where A = 1 and is hit by a shock in year 0 that lowers A permanently. The economy
gradually converges to the new steady state where A is small. In this transition, the
labor wedge is improved slightly and returns gradually to the original value.11
9Note that this argument is not a rigorous proof for the uniqueness of the steady state equilibrium,
but a description of our numerical ﬁndings.
10 Denote the variables in the solution with a smaller k by subscript 1 and those in the solution with
a large k by subscript 2. Call the two solutions “State 1” and “State 2,” respectively. Suppose that the
economy is in State 2. Given that the initial capital stock is k2,aﬁrm obtains the discounted present












.I fV12 >V 2,
all ﬁrms are better oﬀ by choosing k1 and n1 in State 2, implying that State 2 cannot be sustainable.
We numerically showed that this is exactly the case, i.e., V12 >V 2.W e a l s o c o n ﬁrmed that V21 <V 1,
implying that no ﬁrms deviate from State 1 if all the other ﬁrms choose k1 and n1. This argument shows
that State 1 is the (possibly) unique steady state equilibrium.
11We also compute the transitional dynamics of the model in the case where productivity A does not
change but the future expectations for A decline. The economy is initially in the steady state where
18Since the deterioration of the labor wedge is the central puzzle that a theory must
explain, the above results imply that a productivity decline is not a plausible cause of
the tightening of borrowing constraints.12
We also analyzed a diﬀerent model in which land is used as collateral and examined
the performance of the model in the case where an unexpected shock decreases the pro-
ductivity of land. The result, which is brieﬂy described in Appendix B, is counterfactual:
Capital stock k increases in response to the decline of land productivity. Thus, a decline
of land productivity cannot account for the depressions on its own either.
There is a caveat for our conclusion that productivity declines are not a plausible
factor that accounts for the puzzling features in depression episodes. The above results
crucially depend on the simplicity of our model (e.g., nonexistence of adjustment costs for
investment). If we introduce a diﬀerent set of assumptions, such as those in Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005), productivity declines may generate plausible outcomes.
But we do not explore in this direction, since in this paper we would like to maintain
a simple neoclassical growth model with as few nonstandard assumptions as possible.
To specify the setup of a model in which productivity declines solely generate plausible
outcomes is a topic for future work.
3.2 Emergence of large debts and obstacles to debt repayments
Assuming that a sudden tightening of borrowing constraints is the correct explanation
for the US Great Depression and the 1990s in Japan, we need to clarify the driving force
that brought about the sudden tightening. As we discussed in the previous subsection, a
decline of productivity A can explain the decline of θVt, the right-hand side of (21), but
A = 1 and is hit by a shock in year 0 that makes all agents believe that A will become 0.95 in year 10.
Parameter θ is set at 0.05 for convenience in numerical calculation. In the transition period between
years 0 and 9, the labor wedge declines, while labor input remains at the same value as that in the
initial steady state, and investment increases. These features are inconsistent with the actual depression
episodes, in which both labor input and investment decreased.
12This conclusion also holds for the Kiyotaki-Moore type model in which the borrowing constraint is
(1 + rbt)ptLt ≤ θkt instead of (21).
19it cannot explain the deterioration of the labor wedge.
Our conjecture is that what is necessary is the emergence of large nonperforming
debts subsequent to an unexpected collapse of asset prices.
During several years until the asset-price collapses in 1929 in the United States and
in 1990 in Japan, ﬁrms and households accumulated debts and assets in accordance
with the rise of asset prices. When the asset prices collapsed, people suddenly noticed
that their debts were backed by nothing. We do not attempt to explain why asset-price
“bubbles” are generated and why they collapsed; we simply assume that an unspeciﬁed
exogenous shock generated a large asset-price ﬂuctuation that left large debts in the
corporate sector.
These events can be described in our model as a sudden and unexpected emergence
of large debts, N0,i ny e a r0i nﬁrms’ balance sheets. If a ﬁrm has inherited a debt, Nt,
from year t − 1, the borrowing constraint (21) becomes
(1 + rbt)pt(Lt + Nt) ≤ θVt, (30)
showing that the borrowing constraint is tightened by the debt.13 Although it is obvious
that the constraint is tightened by the emergence of the debt, it may not last for a
long time. In what follows, we show that in order for the tightening of the borrowing
constraint to remain for years, there must be some political or institutional distortion
that prevents ﬁrms from repaying their debts as completely as they want to.
To show this result, we now examine the case where ﬁrms are subject to no restrictions
in repaying debts. We maintain the assumption that ﬁrms act in the interest of their








t −[kt+1 −(1−δ)kt]+pt[Nt+1 −(1+rbt)Nt]−(1+rbt)ptLt,s u b j e c t
to (10) and (30). In this problem, we assume that the ﬁrm can freely choose the amount
13Lamont (1995) also analyzes the adverse eﬀect of corporate-debt overhang. In the Lamont model, the
existing debts constrain the amount of new borrowing and thus reduce aggregate investment. He focuses
on the adverse eﬀect of debt overhang on investment expenditure, while we address the relationship
between the debt problem and labor input.
20of repayment, pt[(1 + rbt)Nt − Nt+1], where Nt+1 is the debt that is carried over to the
next year.14 The ﬁrst-order condition for Nt+1 implies that
λtpt =( 1+rbt+1)(λt+1 + μt+1)pt+1, (31)
if Nt+1 > 0, where μt is the Lagrange multiplier for (30) and thus μt ≥ 0. Equations (8)
and (31) imply that if Nt+1 > 0, it must be the case that (rbt+1 − rdt+1)pt+1λt+1 +( 1+
rbt+1)μt+1pt+1 = 0. This equation does not hold as long as rdt+1 > 0. Therefore, if the
government sets the nominal deposit rate at a positive value in year 1, ﬁrms optimally
choose N1 = 0, i.e., they repay all the debts in year 0, and the tightening of the borrowing
constraint does not continue.15
The above argument implies that once-for-all emergence of large debts is not suﬃcient
to explain a persistent tightening of borrowing constraints. The persistent tightening
may be explained by successive reemergence of debts during the ﬁrst several years of a
depression and/or by institutional or political obstacles in repaying debts (e.g., collusive
forbearance policy by ﬁrms, banks, and the government). Since the asset-price deﬂation
continued for several years in both depression episodes in the US and Japan, it seems
plausible to assume in our model that there are multiple shocks that generate large debts
for the ﬁrst several years. The multiple-shock story may not be suﬃcient, however, since
14The corporate value, Vt, in (30) is still deﬁned by (22) using πt,n o tπ
n
t . This is because the value
that the creditor of Nt can recapture by seizing the ﬁrm in the event of default is the discounted present
value of the ﬂow of πts, not π
n
t s.
15In this argument, we ignored the restriction that π
n
t ≥ 0. If the debt repayment becomes large,
the nonnegativity of dividends may be violated. But it is easily shown as follows that for realistic
parameter values, this restriction does not bind. Since (1 + rbt)ptLt is the labor share of the output,
which is approximately 0.7 of the total output in reality, and kt+1 − (1 − δ)kt is investment, which is
approximately 0.1 of the total output in reality, the remaining amount that can be used for repayment
o fd e b t si sa p p r o x i m a t e l y0 . 2( =1−0.7−0.1) of the total output. Therefore, if the debt, N0,i sl e s st h a n
0.2 of the total output, ﬁrms can repay all debts at date 0 without violating the constraint π
n
0 > 0. The
total amount of nonperforming loans during the entire period of the 1990s in Japan is said to have been
about 100 trillion yen (0.9 trillion US dollars), which is about 0.2 of the annual gross domestic product
of Japan. Therefore, the assumption that the initial amount of debts, N0, is less than 0.2 of the total
output is quite realistic.
21the above argument implies that all debts are repaid immediately after the shocks are
gone. This feature is not consistent with empirical ﬁndings. Chari et al. (2002, 2004)
show that the labor wedge deterioration continued throughout the 1930s, and Mulligan
(2002) shows that it continued at least until 1950.
A more realistic hypothesis is the existence of institutional obstacles or political
distortions that prevent ﬁrms from repaying their debts optimally. Anari, Kolari, and
Mason (2002) report that asset liquidations of nationally chartered banks lasted on the
average for over six years during the US Great Depression and argue that their data series
suggests that perverse eﬀects of the banking crises did not end with the bank holiday of
March 1933 but persisted well into the late 1930s. This research implies that bankruptcy
practices of ﬁrms and banks might have been ineﬃcient compared with today’s standard
and that this ineﬃciency in the corporate restructuring process might have delayed the
reduction of large nonperforming debts in the 1930s in the United States.
The type of political distortion that seems typical for the 1990s in Japan is a collusive
forbearance policy (see, for example, Peek and Rosengren [2003] and Caballero, Hoshi,
and Kashyap [2004]). It is a widely accepted view that throughout the 1990s ﬁrms,
banks, and the government decided to roll over huge bad loans in the hope of an asset-
price recovery, which would turn nonperforming loans into performing ones. A symbolic
episode is the bankruptcy of Sogo, a major department store chain. The Sogo group
ﬁled under the Civil Rehabilitation Law on July 12, 2000, with its total debt mounting
up to nearly 2 trillion yen (16 billion dollars). Just as astonishing as the amount of
Sogo’s debt was the testimony before the National Diet by Masao Nishimura, head of
the Industrial Bank of Japan, Sogo’s largest creditor. On July 17, 2000, he confessed in
the Diet that his bank had known six years before Sogo’s bankruptcy that the department
store group was insolvent. During the six years, Sogo doubled the amount of its debt.
The Sogo case is only one example of the prevalent forbearance and procrastination in
the 1990s. Journalists reported successively throughout the 1990s that many de facto
insolvent companies were being kept alive by the rolling over of bad loans.
223.3 Dynamics with debts and a productivity shock
In order to formalize the arguments in the previous subsection, we assume that the
rate of debt repayment {vt}∞
t=0 is given exogenously, where vt(1 + rbt)ptNt is the real
amount of debt repayment by a ﬁrm. Therefore, the amount of debts evolves by Nt+1 =
(1 − vt)(1 + rbt)Nt. We also assume that banks are the creditors of the nonperforming
debts Nt. There is a caveat for the interpretation of Nt: Although we interpret in this
paper that Nt represents a “nonperforming debt” or “bad debt,” no distinction is drawn
between nonperforming (or bad) debts and good debts in the formal model below; as
long as ﬁrms have a large debt Nt from banks subject to the above exogenous rates of
repayment, the model has the same outcomes; therefore, we can interpret alternatively
that Nt is just a long-term debt.
The basic model is changed as follows: The consumer’s problem is unchanged; the
ﬁrm’s problem is to maximize
P∞
t=0 λtπv




















t + Zt = Xt, (32)
instead of (16), where Ns
t is the amount of bad loans.16 In the equilibrium, equation
(18) holds, Πnb =0 ,Ls
t = Lt, Ns
t = Nt,a n dDt = Zt + Nt.












16Note as we mentioned in the above caveat that there is no distinction in this formal model between
b a da n dg o o dl o a n s .W ec a ni n t e r p r e tN
s
t as just a long-term loan, the law of evolution of which is given
exogenously.
23Before we analyze the dynamics, we compute the steady state where the real value
of the nonperforming debt ptNt is constant at N to see the basic features of the model.
In order to keep the real value of the debt constant, we need to assume that vt =
1 −
pt
(1+rbt)pt+1,i . e . ,ﬁrms are allowed to repay only the (real) interest on the debt. The
steady state in which the real value of the debt is N is the solution to the system of










instead of (27). We numerically solve the above system of equations and ﬁnd that
there are two solutions, only one of which survives as a steady state equilibrium by
the same reasoning as in footnote 10. We calculate the steady states corresponding to
various values of N, while keeping A at 1. In this case, the labor wedge is worsened
and the investment wedge is improved as N increases. This result is consistent with the
actual depression episodes. But steady-state capital stock k and corporate value V also
increase as N increases. This result is counterfactual, since in actual depression episodes
the deterioration of the labor wedge coexists with declines in (detrended) capital stocks.
The economic intuition behind this result is rather simple: An increase in N tightens
the borrowing constraint and therefore makes k more valuable as collateral, since the
borrowing is limited by V , which is an increasing function of k;s i n c ek becomes more
valuable, investments become more proﬁtable for ﬁrms, or, in other words, the investment
wedge is improved; and therefore the investments are enhanced and the steady state
values of k and V increase. A simple but theoretically problematic modiﬁcation of the
model in this section may enable the tightened borrowing constraint alone to account for
the decrease in k. We explore this possibility in Appendix C.
Numerous trials and errors in calculations by computer showed us that both the
productivity declines and the emergence of debts are necessary under the endogenous
borrowing constraint to account for the depression episodes.17 It seems plausible to
assume that the emergence of bad debts is associated with a negative productivity shock.
17This conclusion also holds for the Kiyotaki-Moore type model in which the borrowing constraint is
(1 + rb)pt(Lt + Nt) ≤ θkt.
24In the steady state where A =0 .9a n dN =0 .02, the allocations are k =2 .0149,
n =0 .3081, and c =0 .3662. The labor wedge is 0.9564 and the investment wedge is
0.9019. Comparison with the steady state where A = 1 and N = 0 (see Section 3.1)
implies that in the steady state with lower productivity and a positive amount of debts,
the capital stock and labor input both decrease, while the labor wedge is worsened and
the investment wedge is improved. These features are consistent with the observations in
actual depression episodes. A noticeable point is that the improvement of the investment
wedge seems too large, since it improved only slightly in the actual depression episodes
(see Kobayashi and Inaba [2005]). We can easily make the improvement of the investment
wedge smaller by a plausible modiﬁcation of the model by assuming wtnt + kt+1 − (1 −
δ)kt =( 1+rdt)ptLt instead of (10). That is, if investment expenditure is also subject
to the borrowing constraint, the investment wedge does not improve very much. (In
the modiﬁed model, 1 − τl =0 .9270 and 1 + τx =0 .9052 if A = 1 and N =0 ,a n d
1 − τl =0 .9130 and 1 + τx =0 .8847 if A =0 .9a n dN =0 .02. This result implies that
the improvement of the investment wedge becomes moderate under this modiﬁcation.
To save space, we do not report the detailed results of this modiﬁcation here.)
We show the transitional dynamics of the economy from the steady state where A =1
and N = 0 to that where A =0 .9a n dN =0 .02 in Figure 4. It is assumed that the
economy was in the former steady state until year 0; and that in year 0 an unexpected
shock hits the economy and A becomes0.9a n dN becomes0.02 permanently. We conduct
the simulation for both rdt = 1
β − 1 for all t and rdt =0f o rt ≥ 0. Since the movements
of real variables are qualitatively the same for both cases, we show in all panels except
the last one the results for the cases where the government sets rdt = 1
β −1 for all t;t h e
last panel shows the inﬂation rate in the case where rdt =0f o rt ≥ 0.
Figure 4. Transitional dynamics with debts and a productivity decline
The results are qualitatively the same as Figures 2 and 3. There are slight improvements:
Labor input falls slowly, while investment jumps down on impact. The movements of
these variables seem more close to actual data than those in Figures 2 and 3. On the
other hand, the labor wedge jumps up on impact and then falls gradually to the lower
25steady state value. Compared with the other ﬁgures, the rise on impact of the labor
wedge is unique to Figure 4 and is caused by the decline of productivity A.O n e m a y
consider this jump as counterfactual and regard it as a ground to judge that the model
in this section is inferior to that in the next section. The implication of this simulation
for the inﬂation rate is the same as that in Section 2: The zero-interest-rate policy that
sets rdt = 0 brings about persistent and moderate deﬂation, while the real distortion,
represented by the labor wedge, also persists because of the tightening of the borrowing
constraint. Social welfare (
P∞
t=0 βtU(ct,n t)) is −86.7831 in the case where rdt = 1
β − 1
and is −86.7762 in the case where rdt =0 .I tw o u l db e−79.9255 if the economy stayed
in the original steady state where A = 1 and N =0 . T h ew e l f a r ee ﬀect of monetary
policy is negligibly small.
Implications for asset prices Corporate value V is 2.116 in the steady state where
A = 1 and N = 0, while it is 1.924 in the steady state where A =0 .9a n dN =0 .02.
It is shown in our numerical calculation that a decrease in A per se decreases steady-
state corporate value V , and an increase in N increases V . The result implies that the
eﬀect of a productivity decline on corporate value is dominant. Since corporate value
represents asset prices in this model, it can be said as follows: If the productivity decline
and the nonperforming debts in combination are the causes of persistent recession, the
resolution of the debt problem that makes N = 0 may bring about economic recovery by
eradicating real distortions caused by the labor wedge, but it may not bring about the
recovery of asset prices.
4 The model with collateralizable corporate shares
In this section, we introduce a twist in the portfolio structure of ﬁrms so that the borrow-
ing is not directly limited by a borrower’s own value. With this (realistic) complication
of corporate balance sheets, the emergence of large debts can account for the puzzling
observations in depression episodes without resorting to a decline of productivity.
Although the structure of the model is slightly more complicated than the model in
26Section 3, only one exogenous factor can account for the observations, while two factors
are necessary in the model of Section 3.3. From the principle of parsimony, one may judge
the model in this section to be superior as a hypothesis for the puzzling observations in
the depressions.
The twist we introduce is mutual shareholdings among ﬁrms (see the following sub-
section for formal arguments). We assume that ﬁrms issue bonds to ﬁnance buying shares
and that, in the end, the ﬁrms mutually hold corporate shares and the consumers hold
corporate bonds. Financial assets, i.e., corporate shares, work as collateral for loans to
the holder-ﬁrms. Mutual shareholding among ﬁrms might seem to be an unnecessary
twist theoretically. But it seems quite realistic as a description of corporate balance
sheets just after the collapse of a speculative bubble. This is because in the periods of
a speculative boom, when share prices skyrocket, ﬁrms buy shares of other ﬁrms, by
issuing debts. This is what happened during the booms in the late 1920s in the United
States and in the late 1980s in Japan.18 Although it seems realistic, whether mutual
shareholding is optimal in whatever sense is a theoretically important question. Since
we do not introduce aggregate or idiosyncratic risk in the model of this paper, we cannot
judge whether the ﬁnancial arrangements in Sections 2 and 3 or this section can provide
the optimal form of risk-sharing among ﬁrms and consumers. We must say, as Christiano
et al. (2004), that we have not explored whether the distribution of risk associated with
our market arrangements is optimal or even close to optimal. We leave this for future
research.
4.1 Structure
The key assumptions are as follows: Consumers cannot hold corporate shares directly;
they hold corporate bonds, which are nominal bonds with the gross rate of return 1+rdt;19
ﬁrms buy and hold other ﬁrms’ shares using money they get by issuing bonds; and a
ﬁrm’s borrowing from a bank for wage bills is limited by the corporate shares that it owns
18There is also the well-known fact that Japanese ﬁrms developed cross-shareholding as a long-lasting
structure of the postwar Japanese economy. See, for example, Miyajima (2004).
19We assume just for simplicity that corporate bond Bt has the same rate of returns as bank deposits.
27as ﬁnancial assets. Therefore, in the model of this section, a ﬁrm is a shareholder for
other ﬁrms, and the shares work as collateral for working capital loans to the holder-ﬁrm.
According to the above assumption, the model in Section 3.3 is modiﬁed as follows.







ct + ptMt+1 + pt{Dt+1 + Bt+1} ≤ wtnt + ptMt +( 1+rdt)pt{Dt + Bt}, (35)
where Bt is the nominal amount of the corporate bonds. The real proﬁts of a ﬁrm in






where πt is the dividend from one unit of corporate shares and is exogenously given for
the holder-ﬁrm, qt is the share price, st is the amount of shares, and vt is the exogenously
determined rate of repayment. Note that we maintain the assumption in Section 3 that
some political or institutional distortion prevents ﬁrms from repaying debts optimally.
In the equilibrium, πt = πs
t, st =1 ,a n dNt+1 =( 1− vt)(1 + rbt)Nt.T h eﬁrm chooses
kt+1, nt,a n dst+1 in year t, to maximize the present value of the dividend stream subject
to the constraints:
qtst+1 = ptBt+1, (37)
wtnt =( 1+rdt)ptLt, (38)
(1 + rbt)pt{Lt + Nt} ≤ θqtst. (39)

























wtnt +( 1+rbt)ptNt ≤ θqtst. (40)
The bank’s problem is identical to that in Section 3.3.
4.2 Dynamics
The FOCs for the consumer’s problem imply that equations (5), (6), and (8) hold in the



















wt{λt + μt}, (42)
λtqt = λt+1[πt+1 + qt+1]+θqt+1μt+1, (43)
where we used (8) to derive (43). From the binding borrowing constraint, nt is determined
as follows:
nt =




The equilibrium dynamics are determined by (5), (6), (8), (19), (41), (42), (43), (44),
and the equilibrium conditions: st =1 ,πt = πt,a n dNt+1 =( 1− vt)(1 + rbt)Nt.F o r





so that the real value of the remaining debt, ptNt, is constant at N for all t.
We set all parameters at the same values as those in Sections 2 and 3. The produc-
tivity parameter A is assumed to be constant at 1 for all simulations in this section.20
Computing the steady states corresponding to various values of N,w eﬁnd that
capital stock k, consumption c, and labor input n decrease as N increases; and that
the labor wedge is worsened (i.e, 1 − τl decreases) as N increases. The investment
20It is easily shown by virtually the same arguments as those in Appendix A that the labor wedge
1 − τl is the same for diﬀerent values of A. This implies that in this model, a change in A on its own
cannot explain the deterioration of the labor wedge.
29wedge 1 + τx is constant at 1 as N changes (this result is obvious from the comparison
between equations [2] and [41]). These features are quite consistent with the puzzling
observations in the depression episodes. What seems odd is share price q,w h i c hr i s e s
as N increases. This is because an increase in N tightens the borrowing constraint and
makes corporate shares more valuable as collateral. Thus the model in this section has
the same implication for share prices as the last paragraph of Section 3.3: Share prices
may not recover even if debt N is removed.21
In Figure 5, we report the transition of the economy. Initially in the steady state
where there are no bad debts, it is hit by an unexpected shock in year 0 that generates
a nonperforming debt p0N0 = N in year 0. The economy converges to the new steady
state where there is a positive amount of bad debt N.W es e tN =0 .02. We conduct two
simulations, with rdt = 1
β − 1 in one case and rdt = 0 in the other. Since the results are
qualitatively the same in both cases, we report the results for the case of rdt = 1
β −1i na l l
panels of Figure 5, except for the last panel, in which we report the inﬂation rate for the
case of rdt = 0. The results are plausible: Consumption and labor jump down on impact
and then gradually fall to the new steady state values; investment jumps down on impact
and then rises slightly; capital stock gradually falls to the new steady state value; the
labor wedge jumps down on impact and then gradually falls; and the investment wedge is
constant at 1. As anticipated from the comparison of steady states, the share price rises
on impact. The inﬂation rate is positive in the case of rdt = 1
β −1 and negative in the case
of rdt =0 . S o c i a lw e l f a r e(
P∞
t=0 βtU(ct,n t)) is −80.1336 in the case where rdt = 1
β − 1
and is −80.1327 in the case where rdt =0 .I tw o u l db e−80.1316 if the economy stayed
in the original steady state where A = 1 and N = 0. Therefore, the welfare eﬀect of
monetary policy is only about one-third of the adverse eﬀect of nonperforming debts.
Figure 5. Transitional dynamics of the model with collateralizable corporate shares
21 Since we informally argued that the emergence of bad debt N m a yb ec a u s e db ya na s s e t - p r i c e
collapse, this implication seems problematic. But we do not need to judge the model counterfactual.
Maybe the high asset price before the depression is a nonfundamental bubble, while the low price, i.e.,
the value of q corresponding to N = 0, is the fundamental price of the asset.
305C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
In this paper we explored a theory that explain three puzzling observations of the Great
Depression in the United States and the 1990s in Japan: Persistent deterioration of
the labor wedge; no deterioration or even improvement of the investment wedge; and
protracted deﬂation under extraordinary monetary easing in Japan.
In Section 2, we showed that if ﬁrms need to ﬁnance wage bills using bank loans
subject to a borrowing constraint, a persistent tightening of the constraint can coherently
account for the puzzles. The tighter borrowing constraint implies a larger labor wedge;
the investment wedge does not worsen if investment expenditure is not subject to the
borrowing constraint; and deﬂation is a natural result of a monetary policy that ﬁxes the
nominal interest rate at zero, while the real distortion caused by the tightened borrowing
constraint is not mitigated by the monetary policy.
It was shown that persistent tightening of borrowing constraints is best explained
by an unexpected emergence of large debts and the existence of institutional or political
obstacles that prevent ﬁrms from repaying their debts optimally. In the endogenous con-
straint model in Section 3.3, the emergence and persistence of large debts in combination
with an exogenous decline of productivity can account for the puzzles. The endogeneity
of the borrowing constraint leads to improvement of the investment wedge in response
to the productivity decline and the debt emergence. In the collateral constraint model
in Section 4, the problem of persistent bad debts solely accounts for the three puzzles,
just like the basic model in Section 2.
In sum, the emergence and persistence of large bad debts in the corporate sector may
be a major contributor to a protracted recession.
If debt repayment was delayed by collusive forbearance by ﬁrms, banks, and the
government, which hoped for an economic recovery that would turn bad debts into good
ones, it can be said that the models in Sections 3 and 4 deliver an ironic lesson for
economic policy: Economic activities may have been forced into stagnation for a long
time by the forbearance policy, even though the government, banks, and ﬁrms pursued
this policy simply to endure the recession until the economy recovered spontaneously. If
31instead the forbearance policy had been terminated and bad debts disposed of quickly,
borrowing constraints might have been loosened, and the economy might have escaped
from the recession more quickly. In other words, a forbearance policy that causes large
debts to remain may be a major cause of the lengthening of a recession brought on by
an asset-price collapse. This lesson is precisely a theoretical translation of what Robert
E. Rubin, the seventieth US Secretary of the Treasury, said about the Japanese in the
1990s (see the epigraph).
To incorporate the borrowing constraint in this paper into the quantitative business
cycle models developed in recent literature (e.g., Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans
[2005] and Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist [1999]) will be a topic of our future work.
If borrowing constraints can be incorporated with realistic twists, such as stochastic
shocks, nominal rigidities, habit persistence, and adjustment costs for capital formation,
they may be useful in accounting for, say, the observed productivity declines in depression
episodes22 and asset price dynamics. They may also be useful for assessing monetary
policy in a more realistic environment.
6A p p e n d i x
6.1 Appendix A: The invariance of the labor wedge under productivity
changes
In this appendix, we show that in the model of Section 3.1 the steady-state labor wedge
is invariant for diﬀerent values of productivity A. We show that this invariance holds
for any type of utility function. The system of equations that characterizes the steady
state, i.e., (26)—(29), can be rewritten under the general utility function as follows:
c + δk = Akαn1−α, (45)
22Many researchers point to a decline in total factor productivity as a primal cause of great depressions:
See Cole and Ohanian (1999), Ohanian (2001), and Chari et al. (2002, 2004) for the Great Depression in
the United States; Hayashi and Prescott (2002) for Japan; Ahearne et al. (2005) for Ireland; and Kehoe


















































where Uc and Un are the derivatives of the utility function with respect to consumption
and the labor supply, respectively. The steady-state labor wedge is deﬁned by


























´α (= 1 − τl). (52)
The system of the four equations (45)—(48) is converted by some algebra to the system
of the following three equations for x, y,a n dz:



















[αy +1− δ]. (55)
The economic variables in a steady state (i.e., c, n,a n dk) are calculated from equations
(50)—(52), using the solution to the system of equations (53)—(55). It is obvious that the
system of equations (53)—(55) is invariant to a change in A, implying that the steady-state
labor wedge 1 − τl = z is invariant to a change in A. (End of proof)
6.2 Appendix B: A model with collateralizable land
One conjecture that can explain a sudden and persistent tightening of borrowing con-
straints is prevalent pessimism over (future) productivity of collateralizable assets, e.g.,
33land. In this appendix, we formally posit this hypothesis and show that it cannot con-
sistently explain a tightening of borrowing constraints and decline in capital stocks.
We assume that the ﬁrms’ borrowing is constrained by the value of a collateralizable
asset that the borrower owns. For simplicity, we assume that land is the only collater-
alizable asset and that the total supply of land is ﬁxed at one. The ﬁrm can produce
consumer goods from capital and labor by the production function, Akα
t n1−α
1t ,a n da l s o




2t ,w h e r eat is the amount of land and n1t and n2t are
labor inputs to capital and land, respectively.
The consumer’s problem and the bank’s problem are identical to those in Section 2.1.
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(1 + rbt)ptLt ≤ qa
t θat.
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Denoting the Lagrange multiplier for (57) by μt, the FOCs are
λt = λt+1[αAx1−α


















34where x1t = n1t
kt and x2t = n2t
at . The equilibrium path is determined by (57) with equality,




2t +( 1− δ)kt − ct, (62)
and the equilibrium condition, at = 1. We numerically compute two steady states, in one
of which B is large and in the other B is small. A noticeable feature of the simulation
outcome is that the capital stock is larger in the steady state where B is smaller. The
economic intuition behind this result is as follows: Since (58) holds in both steady states,
x1 is the same in both. This fact and equations (59) and (60) imply that x2 (and n2)i s
smaller in the steady state with a smaller B. Since we may assume that the amount of
total labor supply (n1 + n2) by the consumers does not change much between the two
steady states, a smaller n2 implies that n1 is larger in the steady state with a smaller B.
Since x1 = n1
k is identical for the two steady states, a larger n1 implies that capital stock
k is larger in the steady state with a smaller B than in the steady state with a larger
B. In summary, if the productivity of land B decreases, capital stocks become relatively
more productive than land (and labor), and therefore ﬁrms will invest more in k.
This result implies a counterfactual prediction in the case where B decreases sud-
denly due to an exogenous shock: In this case, capital stocks would increase,w h i l et h e
borrowing constraint is tightened. This prediction is not consistent with the drastic
shrinkages of investment and (detrended) capital stocks that were observed in the US
Great Depression and the 1990s in Japan.23
6.3 Appendix C: A model with heavy information asymmetry
In this appendix, we explore a modiﬁcation of the model of Section 3.3 that enables the
tightening of the borrowing constraint to account for a depression, without resorting to
23We checked the model in the case where investment expenditure is also subject to the borrowing
constraint: We replaced equation (57) by
1+rbt
1+rdt{wtnt + kt+1 − (1 − δ)kt} ≤ q
a
t θat,a n dw ec o m p a r e dt h e
steady states for various values of B to ﬁnd the same result that k increases as B decreases. We also
found that k becomes smaller in a steady state where A is smaller; but in this case, the labor wedge
1 − τl becomes larger. This is again inconsistent with the actual depression episodes.
35an exogenous decline of productivity.





(1 + rbt)pt(Lt + Nt) ≤ bt (63)
instead of (30), and to impose the equilibrium condition that the following equation must
hold in the equilibrium:
bt = θVt. (64)
The key diﬀerence from Section 3.3 is that the ﬁrm takes the borrowing limit bt as an
exogenous parameter, which equals θVt in the equilibrium. In Figure 6, we report the
transitional dynamics when an economy, which was initially in the steady state where
N = 0, is hit by a macroshock that makes N =0 .02. We assume that productivity A
is constant at 1 for all t. The economic variables and wedges exhibit plausible features.
In particular, it is noticeable that capital stock k decreases without productivity change.
Another noticeable point is that asset price Vt−N rises, a movement we do not consider
to be inconsistent. See footnote 21.
Figure 6. Transitional dynamics of the information asymmetry model
Therefore, if we adopt the above modiﬁcation, the model implies that the emergence
of persistent debts may be the sole cause of the puzzling features in depression episodes.24
There is, however, a theoretical diﬃculty in justifying this modiﬁcation. This is
because the model requires that corporate value be in some sense exogenous to the
ﬁrm itself. One possible way to justify this is to assume serious information asymmetry
between ﬁrms and banks (or investors in the stock market, i.e., consumers in the model).
If banks cannot observe the ﬁrm’s choice of variables {kt+1,n t}∞
t=0, they cannot know
the exact value that they can recover when they seize the borrower-ﬁrm in the event of
default; therefore, banks may set the limit of lending bt at θV t,w h e r eV t is the market
average of corporate value. In this case, the ﬁrm’s problem becomes what we described
above. Even in the case where banks can observe {kt+1,n t} of the borrower, they may
24Similar results are obtained even if we change the equilibrium condition (64) to bt = θkt.
36set bt = θV t, if we assume that a bank cannot operate the seized ﬁrm but needs to sell
it in the market and that investors in the market cannot observe {kt+1,n t} of the ﬁrm
before they buy it.
The existence of serious information asymmetry between ﬁrms and banks may be
regarded as a plausible assumption if we consider the working capital loan in the model
to represent not only bank loans but also trade credits in reality. A supplier who provides
trade credit to its customers may not have monitoring technology like banks and may be
subject to serious information asymmetry, so that it cannot know the borrowers’ choice
of {kt+1,n t}.
Although these assumptions concerning information asymmetry may be question-
able, the modiﬁed model delivers an interesting implication for economic policy: The
emergence of persistent nonperforming debts may be the sole cause of real distortions,
represented by decreases in both labor and capital; therefore, the resolution of the bad
debt problem may bring about economic recovery, but it may not induce a rise in asset
prices.
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 Figure 4. Transitional dynamics with debts and a productivity decline 
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 Figure 5. Transitional dynamics of the model with collateralizable corporate shares 
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 Figure 6. Transitional dynamics of the information asymmetry model 
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